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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR R. JOHNSON and EVA , 
JOHNSON, his wife, 
Plaintiffs a'J'I..d AppellO/Ytits, 
vs. 
PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIF·T 
CO~IP ANY, a corporation, et al, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Appellants' Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
Case No. 
8024 
The original complaint was filed August 4, 1950. On 
October 30, 1950, pursuant to order of the court, an 
amended complaint was filed which named additional 
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parties to the action. On May 23, 1952, a pre-trial was 
held before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, judge of the 
Third .Judicial District Court. The transcript of the pre-
trial reads as follows: (R. 44-46 inc.) 
"Be it remembered that the a:bove-entitled 
matter came on regularly for pretrial on Friday, 
May 23, 1952, at the hour of two o'clock p.m., 
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, one of the 
judges of the above named court, the respective 
parties being represented by the following: 
APPEARANCES 
"For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendants 
Francis S. Johnson 
and Banie W. John-
son and Ebba E. Fin-
layson: 
For the Defendants 
Andrew Reid and 
Mary W. Reid, his 
wife: 
For the Defendants 
A. R. Kartchner and 
Ada Kartchner, his 
wife: 
LeGrand P. Backman, 
Esq. 
F. Robert Bayle, Esq. 
Grant Macfarlane, Esq. 
David H. Bybee, Esq. 
(Following is a transcript of the stipulation 
entered into at the close of the pre-trial:) 
THE COURT: This case is settled, and 
who will stipulate the conditions of the settle-
ment~ Who will state it~ 
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~IR .. BACKMAN: The settlement will be 
that we will allow -
THE COURT: Name the plaintiffs, will 
you~ 
illR. BACKMAN: The plaintiffs, Arthur 
Johnson and Eva Johnson, his wife, will allow 
Ebba E. Finlayson a claim of one thousand dol-
lars on the uniform real estate contract and will 
convey to Ebba Finlayson the property west of 
the Fassie tract- isn't that it~ 
~IR. BAYLE: Yes, straight west. 
illR. BACKMAN: - running the full depth 
of the property, and a new contract will then be 
entered into with Ebba Finlayson describing the 
balance of the property within the fence lines . 
.JIR. BAYLE: And to include the right-of-
way. 
:MR. BACKMAN: And to include one-half 
rod right-of-way along the east. 
~IR. BAYLE : And under the same terms. 
illR. BACKMAN: One rod right-of-way. 
:NfR. BAYLE: Yes, it's a one rod. 
illR. BACKMAN: One rod right-of-way 
along the east. 
l\IR. BAYLE : And under the same -
MR. BACKMAN: Under the same terms. 
:MR.. BAYLE : - terms of payment. 
MR. BACKMAN: Of payment. We will 
give to Andrew Reid a quitclaim deed for the 
89-
1\[R. MACFARLANE: We would like to go 
around the fence line, so there isn't any question. 
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MR. BACKMAN: Quitclaim deed on the 
whole tract. 
MR. MACFARLANE: Yes. 
MR. BACKMAN: All right. That is within 
the fence line. 
MR. MACFARLANE: Yes, within the fence 
line. 
MR. BYBEE: Yes. 
MR. MACFARLANE: Now, they had bet-
ter give that to you, and then you give us the 
warranty because there is those lots that will be 
affected 
THE COURT: Who is Dave's clients~ 
MR. BYBEE: Yes. 
l\fR. MACFARLANE : Better give that to 
Kartchner. 
MR. BACKMAN: We will give quitclaim 
deed to Kartchner of the property now in the 
possession of Kartchner and Reid within the 
fence lines. 
MR. MACFARLANE: Yes, on payment of 
fifty dollars. 
MR. BACKMAN: Upon payment of the sum 
of fifty dollars. 
THE COURT: And you gentlemen agree, 
Mr. Bybee~ 
MR. MACFARLANE : I agree to that for 
Andrew Reid. 
MR. BYBEE : I will agree for Kartchner. 
MR. MACFARLANE: What about quit-
claim from you~ 
MR. BACKMAN: Your contract is on rec-
or d. 
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~fR. BAYLE: We will join in the quitclaim 
deed or give you a separate quitclaim deed on 
behalf of Ebba E. Finlayson to the property 
which is in contest on the south boundary of the 
Ebba E. Finlayson property and on the north of 
the Reid property. 
:JIR. :MACFARLANE: Yes. Their quitclaim 
may not be as broad -
:JIR. BACKMAN: Then we will give you for 
Francis Johnson - the plaintiffs will also give 
to Francis Johnson a quitclaim deed for a tract 
fifty-eight feet in width adjoining his property 
on the north. 
~IR .. BAYLE: 58.7. 
l\IR. BACKMAN: 58.7. 
THE COURT: There is one other thing. 
Then you two gentlemen are going to enter into 
a new contract, aren't you~ 
niR. BACKMAN: Yes. We have recited 
that. 
THE ·COURT : Excuse me. Then shall I 
just hold this case until you have made those 
transfers, and then you will join in petitions to 
dismiss~ 
MR. BACKMAN: I think that will be well. 
MR. BAYLE: That is agreeable. 
MR. BYBEE: Satisfactory. 
No pre-trial order was made as a result of the hear-
ing. On February 14, 1953, there was filed with the court 
by counsel for Defendants Reid a judgment. (R. 39-43). 
On February 14, 1953, plaintiffs filed objections to the 
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judgment filed by the Defendants Reid. (R. 47-48). On 
February 16, 1953, an additional stipulation was entered 
into. (R. 71-74 ). On March 7, 1953, counsel for plaintiffs 
filed a motion, notice and affidavit to set aside the 
stipulation entered into at the pre-trial and asking that 
the case be set down for trial. Said motion was denied. 
(R. 49-52). On March 26, 1953, the judgment was signed 
by the court. (R. 53-58). 
On March 31, 1953, another judgment was proposed 
(R. 61-65) and on March 31, 1953, plaintiffs filed objec-
tions to this proposed judgment. (R. 59-60). 
Motion for a new trial was filed April 4, 1953 (R. 
67) and denied April 23, 1953. (R. 68). Notice of Appeal 
was filed May 21, 195'3. 
STATEl\IEXT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID AS THERE WERE 
NO FINDINGS OF FACT AND NO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FILED WITH THE JUDGMENT AND THERE WAS NO 
WAIVER OF THE SAME. 
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID AS IT IS SUP-
POSEDLY BASED UPON A PRE-TRIAL HEARING TO 
WHICH THE COURT MADE NO PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS 
REQUIRED BY THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
OR IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE JUDGMENT REN-
DERED IS THE "PRE-TRIAL ORDER" THEN SAID JUDG-
MENT AND ORDER ARE VOID AS THEY ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE STIPULATION PRESENTED AT THE 
PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
POINT III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO VACATE THE 
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STIPULATION ENTERED INTO AT THE PRE-TRIAL 
HEARING MAY 23, 1952, AND IN FAILING TO SET THE 
ACTION DOWN FOR TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID AS THERE WERE 
NO FINDINGS OF FACT AND NO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FILED WITH THE JUDGMENT AND THERE WAS NO 
WAIVER OF THE SAME. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide as fol-
lows: 
Rule ;):2 - Findings by the Court. 
•· (a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall, unless the same are waived, find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon and direct the entry of the appro-
priate judgment; and in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law which constitute the grounds of its action. 
Requests for findings are not necessary for pur-
poses of review. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be con-
sidered as the findings of the court. Findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on 
decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any 
other motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b)." 
* * * * * 
'' (c) Waiver of Findings of F'act and Con-
clusions of Law. Except in actions for divorce, 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law may be 
waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
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(1) By default or by failing to appear at 
the trial; 
(2) By consent in writing, filed in the 
cause; 
(3) By oral consent in open court, entered 
in the minutes." 
It has always been the law of this state in accordance 
with the above adopted rule, that unless findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are made the judgment has no 
validity, (see Thomas v. Farrell, 26 P 2d 328, 330, 82 
U 535; Dillon Implement Co. v. Cleaveland, 32 U 1, 88 
P 670, 671), and a new trial should be ordered. 
Further, whether it be an action at law or in equity, 
as the present case, the rule is the same. (See, In re 
Thompson Estate, 72 U 17, 35; 269 P 103). 
The record is clear that there was no waiver of the 
making of findings and conclusions by the court and 
no such a construction of the record as would fulfill the 
requirements of a waiver within the above quoted rule 
can be implied. 
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID AS IT IS SUP-
POSEDLY BASED UPON A PRE-TRIAL HEARING TO 
WHICH THE COURT MADE NO PRE-TRIAL ORDER AS 
REQUIRED BY THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
OR IF THIS COURT HOLDS THAT THE JUDGMENT REN-
DERED IS THE "PRE-TRIAL ORDER" THEN SAID JUDG-
MENT AND ORDER ARE VOID AS THEY ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE STIPULATION PRESENTED AT THE 
PRE-TRIAL HEARING. 
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Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
••Pre-Trial Procedure; Formulating Issues 
.. In any action, the court may in its discretion 
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear 
before it for a conference to consider: 
.. The court shall make an order which recites 
the action taken at the conference, * * * and such 
order when entered controls the subsequent course 
of the action * * * " 
The language of the rule is explicit in that it 
requires that: "The court shall make an order * * * " 
It would appear that the same stringent reason for 
requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law to be 
made before entry of judgment, apply to the entry of a 
"pre-trial" order. The present case is a perfect example 
of the jumbled mess that can result when such an order 
is neglected. The parties in the present case without 
such an order are left to argue over the meaning of a 
stipulation, read into the record, and to which stipula-
tion each party attributes his own meaning. The very 
reason for the rule is to obviate different meanings and 
constructions being placed upon the evidence submitted 
by the parties to the action. 
If this court holds that the judgment rendered is 
the "pre-trial order" then said judgment and order are 
void as they are not supported by the stipulation pre-
sented at the pre-trial hearing. 
In the first place, the stipulation entered into at the 
pre-trial hearing May 23, 1952, was never intended by 
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the parties, and was never intended by the court, to be 
the basis for the judgment or "pre-trial order" which 
the court signed. At the end of the stipulation (R. 46) 
the court states: 
"THE COURT: Excuse me. Then shall I 
just hold this case until you have made those 
transfers, and then you will join in petitions to 
dismiss~ 
MR. BACKMAN: I think that will be well. 
l'IIR. BAYLE: That is agreeable. 
MR. BYBEE : Satisfactory." 
It is thus quite apparent that it was the intention of all 
parties and the court that the only action by the court 
would be the granting of the "petition to dismiss" the 
action. Nine months elapsed before the court again 
entered into the record of the proceedings and that was 
when a proposed judgment was filed with the court. 
(R. 43). One only has to read the plaintiffs' objections 
to become aware that the stipulation intended to settle 
the matter between the parties was being given different 
interpretations by the parties. How then can the court 
take it upon itself to render a judgment, deciding for 
itself what the parties intended~ The· portion of the 
stipulation above quoted demonstrates that it was never 
the intention of the parties to have the court render such 
a judgment, and the court never intended to do so at 
the time of the pre-trial hearing. The court should have 
vacated the stipulation and set the case down for trial, U 
for whatever the stipulation meant, there was no agree-
ment between the parties. 
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The stipulation is ambiguous and cannot be made 
to support the judgment rendered. For example, Para-
graph :2 (R. 54) of the judgment provides that the plain-
tiffs shall convey by warranty deed a good one-half of 
the property under the contract of sale before the pur-
chase price is paid, and then Paragraph 1 provides that 
plaintiffs shall enter into a contract of sale for the 
balance. \Yhere the court can find that in the stipulation 
is beyond comprehension. Plaintiff's objections speak 
for themselves, (R. 47, 48, 59, 60) as they must do, for 
there are no facts or evidence in the record. The only 
thing available is the court's interpretation of an ambig-
uous stipulation. It is useless to attempt to argue that 
legal descriptions are wrong; that the property to be 
conveyed is not within the fence lines; that the plain-
tiffs never intended to convey a portion of the property 
under contract without the full purchase price being 
paid. The court precluded the plaintiff from doing this 
when it made its own interpretation of the pre-trial 
stipulation. It is ludicrous to state, as the judgment 
does, R. 53, " . . . the issues being discussed by the 
respective attorneys for the parties, and a meeting of 
the minds having been arrived at, a stipulation was made 
by the respective counsel settling all the issues raised in 
the pleadings in said case, and the court being fully 
advised and approving the stipulation entered into 
by the respective counsel, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: * * * ." 
POINT III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO VACATE THE 
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STIPULATION ENTERED INTO AT THE PRE-TRIAL 
HEARING MAY 23, 1952, AND IN FAILING TO SET THE 
ACTION DOWN FOR TRIAL. 
In addition to the reasons set forth in plaintiffs' 
Point II, which are also applicable to the present argu-
ment, it is plaintiffs' contention that the lower court 
abused its discretion in failing to vacate the pre-trial 
stipulation and set the matter down for trial. 
The law, with respect to the granting of relief from 
stipulations, is fairly set forth in 50 American Juris-
prudence 613, par. 14- Stipulations: 
"Relief from Stipulations. The rule is 
generally recognized that trial courts may, in the 
exercise of sound judicial discretion and in the 
furtherance of justice, relieve parties from stipu-
lations which they have entered into in the course 
of judicial proceedings, and that upon appeal the 
determination of the trial court as to the propriety 
of granting such relief will not ordinarily be inter-
fered with, except where a manifest abuse of 
discretion is disclosed. Courts have frequently 
granted such relief in the case of stipulations 
which the parties have entered into improvidently, 
inadvertently, mistakenly or as a result of fraudu-
lent inducements, especially if the enforcement 
thereof would work an injustice. A stipulation by 
an attorney as to closing the evidence and sub-
mitting the case may be set aside upon the request 
of one of the parties on the ground of improvi-
dence or inadvertence alone, if both parties can 
be restored to their original status. In all cases 
the power to relieve from a stipulation should be 
exercised solely to promote justice. The making 
of stipulations tending to expedite the trial should 
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be encouraged by the c-ourts and enforced unless 
good cause is shown to the contrary. Parties will 
not be relieved from stipulations in the absence 
of a clear showing that the fact or facts stipulated 
are untrue, and then only when the application 
for such relief is seasonably made and good cause 
is shown for the granting of such relief. If a 
stipulation relating to the conduct of a pending 
case is fairly made, it will not be set aside where 
such action will be likely to result in serious 
injury to one of the parties. 
"The proper procedure to vacate a stipula-
tion is by motion, and not by an independent 
action." 
The plaintiffs, being faced with a proposed judgment 
(R. 39-43) which did not conform to their understanding 
of the pre-trial conference, filed with the court a motion 
and affidavit to set aside the pre-trial stipulation and 
set the case down for trial (R. 49-52). It cannot be said 
that any of the parties had relied upon the stipulation 
to their injury because apparently the parties were never 
able to get together under the stipulation and then "move 
the court for dismissal of the action." No transfers had 
been made or contracts or deeds entered into pursuant 
to the stipulation. (R. 44-46). Certainly no one can 
complain that they would have been injured if the case 
had been set down for trial and a hearing had on the 
merits. 
The affidavit filed with the motion is short and 
reads as follows: (R. 51-5'2) 
"ARTHUR R. JOHNSON and EVA JOHN-
SON, being each duly sworn on oath depose and 
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say that they are residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah; of lawful age and that they are 
the plaintiffs named in the within action; that on 
the 23rd day of May, 1952, when the stipulation 
was entered into at the pre-trial of the within 
cause before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, these 
plaintiffs understood that if a new contract was 
to be entered into by them as Sellers and the said 
Ebba E. Finlays-on as the Buyer that the descrip-
tion of the property to be included in the new 
~ontract would conform with the descriptions as 
determined by George W. Cassity, Registered 
Engineer and Land Surveyor, as to the fence lines 
and that the new contract would be an agreement 
to sell to the said Ebba E. Finlayson the real 
property within the fence line description; that 
the new contract would carry the same terms o'f 
payment as the existing contract which calls for 
the payment of Five Hundred and no/100 
( $500.00) or more on the 30th day of each Decem-
ber including interest at the rate of four per cent 
per annum; that in entering the balance remain-
ing to be paid on said con tract that the balance 
owing together with interest on the existing con-
tract was to be computed tq the date of the enter-
ing of the judgment by this Court; that in agree-
ing to accept the sum ·of $25.00 from the Reids and 
the further sum of $25.00 from the Kartchners 
that it was upon the advice of their attorney, 
LeGrand P. Backman, who was not informed of 
the fact that these plaintiffs were not in the 
chain of title as grantors of the property now in 
the possession of the said Reids and Kartchners, 
and that the strip of land 86.33 feet wide and 880 
feet long (approximately 1.74 acres) in the pos-
session of the said Reids and Kartchners and 
claimed by the plaintiffs had not been held 
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adversely by the said defendants Reids and 
Kartelmers and that the sum of $25.00 to be paid 
by each of the defendant~ Reid and Kartchner 
was wholly inadequate and inequitable in relation 
to the amount of $1000.00 demanded by the said 
Ebba E. Finlayson for 73 of an acre shortage 
between the property actually within the fence 
lines of the property in the possession of the said 
Ebba E. Finlayson and the property as described 
in the existing contract; that the plaintiffs were 
not in any way consulted in reference to the con-
veyance to Reids and Kartchners as to any other 
property than the 86.33 feet by 880 feet above 
referred to; that there was a definite misunder-
standing between these plaintiffs and their attor-
ney as to a conveyance of any portion of said 
property and these plaintiffs did not understand 
that any portion of said real property was to be 
conveyed to the said Ebba E. Finlayson at this 
time; that said stipulation was entered into 
improvidently and inadvertently and if enforced 
will work an injustice on these plaintiffs; that 
these plaintiffs aver that all parties should be 
placed in their former status and the matter should 
be tried on its ·merits and that all the facts and 
circumstances should be brought to the attention 
of the court." 
A casual reading of the affidavit of the plaintiffs 
demonstrates they were clearly mistaken as to the mean-
ing of the stipulation, if it means wha.t the courts judg-
ment says it does. Whether it is said that the stipulation 
was entered into mistakenly, improvidently, inadvert-
ently, or whatever nomenclature the court decides to use, 
it is clear, beyond doubt, that plaintiffs never construed 
the stipulation in the same way the court did. This 
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coupled with .the fact that the stipulation is so vague in 
its terms and was never intended as a basis for such a 
judgment or "pre-trial order," makes it hardly possible 
to believe that the court would not vacate it. 
The injustice to the plaintiffs by reason of the failure 
of the court to vacate the stipulation is apparent. Pursu-
ant to the judgment (Par. 2, R. 54) the plaintiffs must 
convey, or have the court do it for them, at least one-
half of the property under the contract of sale, and then 
maintain the contract on the balance of the property. 
In other words, the plaintiffs must convey one-half of 
the real property before the full purchase price is paid. 
This is ordered under the judgment notwithstanding the 
fact that the original contract of sale (R. 19-22) provides 
just the opposite. Can a court be upheld in such action 
unless there is clear evidence that such was the intention 
of the parties~ Yet, the lower court, upon the vague 
facts presented in the stipulation, and faced with a motion 
and affidavit clearly stating that such was never the 
intention of plaintiffs, goes ahead and renders a judg-
ment or "pre-trial order" and sets aside and violates 
the provisions of contract of sale entered into between 
the parties. The court has decided, without reason, that 
the plaintiffs only needed half as much security for their 
contract as was agreed to in the contract. The injustice 
rendered the plaintiffs by the lower courts action can-
not be condoned by this court. The lower court should 
have a great deal of discretion in deciding issues as here 
presented, but when· presented with 'facts and circum-
:~ 
~I 
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stanees such a8 in the present case, it is clearly an abuse 
of that discretion when the court fails to set aside such 
a stipulation and order a trial of the action. 
Here again the motion and affidavit of plaintiffs 
speak for themselves, as they must do, for there are no 
facts evidenced in the record. The only thing available 
is the vague and ambiguous stipulation entered into at 
the pre-trial and the court's interpretation thereof. The 
plaintiff~ are in effect precluded from arguing fence 
lines, legal descriptions and correct contract terms. 
CONCLUSION 
It is plaintiffs' contention that the serious error 
presented in this case is the failure of the lower court 
to pursue correctly the pre-trial procedure. Pre-trial 
practice is an expeditious and should be a sought-after 
means to settle law suits. It is of equal benefit to client, 
attorney and the court to settling complicated and vexa-
tious law suits. However, it is this very benefit that 
can also render such injustice to the parties concerned 
unless the court is fully apprised and a complete and 
detailed record made of the action taken. Party litigants 
frequently settle their differences before a matter is 
ever pres en ted to the court. However, once a court is 
appealed to because of the failure of the parties to settle 
their differences, it is the duty of the court to jealously 
safeguard the rights of both pal'lties. Perhaps this 
appeared to be a long, complicated and unnecessarily 
vexatious law suit to the lower court and taxed the 
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court's patience to the ultimate limit, still the procedure 
that was followed at the pre-trial and subsequent thereto 
dealt injustice to the plaintiffs which this court cannot 
permit to stand. 
Perhaps the fault lies with this court and it would be 
well to review the rule of pre-trial practice and set forth 
in greater detail the requirements necessary if this means 
of settling law suits is to be pursued. 
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the 
lower court should be declared a nullity and the case 
remitted to the lower court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCULLOUGH 
417 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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